Genesis: 1943 - 1945

Yalta     Eclipse      Potsdam      Refugee Control    

The beginning of the Iron Curtain can be traced to the latter years of World War II as the Allied leaders grappled with the problem of what to do with post-war Germany. Planners had to to contend with such issues as de-Nazification, the reestablishment of a destroyed infrastructure, repatriation of forced labor, and the division of Germany into occupation zones.  It was no easy task, and when the occupation plan was finalized and put into effect it unknowingly drew the battle lines for a new kind of war as the ideological differences between the Allied powers began to re-emerge. By 1948, the political divisions between the western bloc and the Soviet Union were so entrenched that they would dominate world politics for the reminder of the century.  

Teheran & Quebec Conferences
The first discussion concerning the German occupation plan occurred during the  Teheran Conference  in November,1943.  At this meeting of the Allied leaders, Franklin Roosevelt initiated the discussion  by proposing that Germany be partitioned into equal slices like a cut pie.  In Roosevelt’s initial proposal, Berlin would serve as the center of the “pie” with each Allied country getting a slice of the city as the occupation zones radiated outward. Although all the leaders agreed in principal with the dissolution of German militarism, talks about dividing the country were in the words of Winston Churchill a "preliminary survey of a vast political problem."[1] The conference did, however, set in motion the European Advisory Commission; a planning board with the paramount goal of mapping the future of post-war Germany. 

The Quebec Conference and the resulting London Protocol on 12 September 1944, built further upon the base established at Teheran. The London Protocol established the division of Germany and Berlin into three occupation zones and attempted to assign each of the Allied powers a sector. While it was unanimous the Soviets would occupy the eastern region of Germany, the United States and Britain argued over which sector they would control. At stake was sea access. Both nations wanted the northwestern zone with its ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven to serve as logistical bases for their forces. Despite the disagreement, the Quebec Conference made significant strides in establishing the strategy for the Allied occupation of Germany, but further refinement was needed before a conclusive agreement was possible.

Yalta: The lines are drawn
By February, 1945, the had Allies hammered out their disagreements and came to an agreement at the Yalta Conference. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet sector was previously determined and only the dispute between the United States and England had clouded the hopes for a final pact. Although President Roosevelt agreed earlier in principle to accept the southern zone in return for the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, questions concerning the administrative control of the ports had prevented a quick settlement prior to Yalta. In the final agreement reached at the conference the Americans received the northern ports as well as access rights through the British sector to the harbors. Another important development was Stalin's concession to allow a French occupation sector. Initially opposed to the proposal, Stalin conceded on the condition that the new zone be created out of the American and British sectors. A French sector in Berlin was also tendered but was not fully approved until the war's end. However, Berlin's special status for joint occupation was reaffirmed, but unlike the American-British agreement which granted U.S. access to the northern ports, there were no contractual provisions guaranteeing ground access through the Soviet zone to the city.[2] This oversight proved significant in the years to follow.  

With the occupation plan finalized, the Big Three separated in the words of Winston Churchill, "not only as Allies, but as friends facing a still mighty foe with whom all our armies were struggling in fierce and ceaseless battle.” [3] Within months, though, the  “mighty foe” was on the verge of total collapse. The Russians had hammered their way across eastern Germany and were fighting in the suburbs of Berlin, while the Anglo armies were marching deep into Germany from the west. By the time the war ended on 9 May 1945, the American spearhead had thrust almost 200 miles into what would soon be the new Soviet occupation zone. Much to the dismay of the Soviets, American troops remained steadfast along this line even after the cessation of hostilities. While the Kremlin insisted on an American withdrawal in accordance with the Yalta agreements, Winston Churchill with tremendous foresight urged the United States to maintain its position within the Russian zone. In June, Churchill cabled President Truman:  

"I view with prolonged misgivings the retreat of the American army to our line of occupation in the central sector, thus bringing Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of an iron curtain between us and everything eastward. I hoped that this retreat if it has to he made, would be accompanied by the resettlement of many great things which would be the true foundation of world peace." [4]  

Regardless of Churchill’s prophetic words, President Truman ordered a retreat from the Soviet zone. American units then began a phased withdrawal westward while the advancing Soviets maintained a two mile buffer zone between the two forces. This withdrawal back to the American sector put into full effect the U.S. occupation plan called ECLIPSE. This plan, which called for the securing of the borders within the American zone, established formal checkpoints on the main avenues into the American zone and dictated the closing of numerous lesser roads and trails.[5] The checkpoints, which were usually manned by a few soldiers and a non-commissioned officer, served as a means to control refugee traffic and to prevent the escape of German intelligence personnel and suspected war criminals. Although workable on paper, this early attempt at monitoring inter-zonal traffic proved to be ineffective .The stationary checkpoints and roadblocks were easily evaded by refugees, and not until the establishment of the American Constabulary forces and the German Land Police in 1946, would the effectiveness of the American effort improve.[6] Nonetheless, these steps established the first control measures along the zonal boundaries.  

The Potsdam Protocol
Soon after the crossing points and roadblocks were put into force, the policies effected at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, unknowingly complicated the scheme for border control between the Anglo and Soviet zones. While American forces were busy policing displaced persons along the border, the Potsdam Communiqué issued on August 2,1945, announced that Poland would govern over 40,000 square miles of the former German Reich that had been ethnically German for hundreds of years. This pronouncement alone would not have hindered border operations, but when combined with Article XII of the Potsdam Protocol which called for "the transfer to Germany of German population, and of elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary", the result was chaos and tragedy. Although Churchill himself had also called for a "clean sweep" of the Germans from eastern Europe less than a year before, by the time of the Potsdam Conference he had "grave, moral scruples" about the forced relocation of more than nine million people. His fears were justified. More than two million ethnic Germans died of exposure, hunger, and disease before reaching their mandated home.[7]

Refugee Control
The relocation plan called for the equitable distribution of displaced persons among the four zones, but it was soon evident the majority of refugees were flooding the western sectors. The Russians, more interested in war reparations than feeding and caring for a new influx of refugees, actively encouraged displaced persons, sometimes at gunpoint, to cross into the British or American zones.[8] The western Allies thus found themselves attempting to feed a German population now larger than before the war began. This problem, combined with the war ravaged economy and chronic housing shortages, placed a severe logistical burden on the Western occupation forces. So grave were the conditions, that General Eisenhower warned the German population that hardships  would abound. Ike's speech.

The significance of this situation cannot be under estimated. The westward migration provided the catalyst for increased tension and security between the Soviet and Anglo zones.  The steady stream of refugees infringed on the delicate balance of survival by competing for what limited shelter, food, and employment were available. Bombing during the war had destroyed over 50% of civilian housing in the large urban areas, thus causing a tremendous hardship for both Germans and refugees as they attempted to find shelter among the rubble.[9]  Hunger and disease also thinned the ranks of the young and elderly. Berlin alone faced an infant mortality rate over 50% in the first months after the war. Food was so scarce that workers were collapsing at work from hunger and food riots broke out  throughout the country during the harsh winter of 1946-47. These problems, combined with the shattered economy, meant immediate action was needed just to provide for the basic survival of people. The practice of "refugee dumping" temporarily relieved the Russians of the these immediate issues and increased the economic and logistical problems for the remaining occupation zones. This practice, though,  would change as the Soviets soon realized that too much of the population in their occupation zone was headed west.

 

 

[1] Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p.343.

[2] Franklin M. Davis,  Come as a Conqueror, (New York: The MacMillian Co., 1967), p.82.

[3]  Winston S. Churchill, Memoirs of the Second World War (new York: Bonanza Books, 1978), p.960.

[4]  Ibid., p.975.

[5]  William E. Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany 1945 - 1983 (Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army), p.5.

[6]  Ibid., p. 11.

[7] William Henry Chamberlain, The German Phoenix: Up From the Ashes - The Rise of Western Germany (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1963), p.34.

[8] Stacy, Border Operations, p.7.

[9] David Childs, Germany Since 1918 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p.113.